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RECENT CASE NOTES
Fortunately, the decision is only representative of the holdings in a rapidly
decreasing minority of jurisdictions.1 8  J. M. C.
PROMOTERS' CONTRACnS-RATIFICATION.-SUit to recover a commission for
services rendered in the reorganization and refinancing of Indianapolis Blue
Print Co., an Indiana corporation, on the theory that plaintiffs had a contract
with the president of that company which defendant had impliedly adopted
and ratified after its incorporation. The promoters had agreed to plaintiffs'
request for a fee of ten percent of the capital obtained. Plaintiffs also per-
formed the part of the agreement which required them to open a set of books
and establish an accounting system for the new corporation (defendant).
Held. A corporation may make a promoter's contract its own in the same
manner it might itself enter into a contract of a similar nature as one of the
original contracting parties, which presupposes an implied ratification in some
situations. Indianapolis Blue Print and Manufacturing Co. v'. John J. Kennedy
(Ind. 1939), 19 N. E. (2d) 554.
The uniformity with which American courts display liberality in allowing
recovery on promoter's contracts is not reflected in the reasoning upon which
the results have been reached.1 Uniformity in the latter respect extends
no farther than the obvious conclusion that a promoter's contract is not a
corporate obligation of its own force. 2 Liability of the corporation and its
ability to enforce must be based on a charter or statutory provision which has
been properly complied with 3 or on some act of the corporation after it is
18Rachal v. Smith (1900), 101 F. 159; Bigelow v. Scott (1903), 135 Ala.
236, 33 S. 546; Stephenson v. Grant (1925), 168 Ark. 927, 271 S. W. 974;
Olson v. Cornwell (Cal., 1933), 25 P. (2d) 879; Federal Land Bank v. Hanks
(1927), 123 Kans. 329, 254 P. 1040; White v. Newhall (1888), 68 Mich. 641,
36 N. W. 699. For another case representing the minority rule see Vaux v.
Vaux (1934), 115 N. J. Eq. 586, 172 A. 68.
The state of the law in Indiana on this point is unsettled. Several cases
hold that the mere loaning of money to a mortgagor to discharge an incum-
brance without more will not entitle the lender to subrogation. McClure v.
Andrews (1879), 68 Ind. 97; Heiny v. Lontz (1896), 147 Ind. 417, 46 N. E.
465. There is a strong dictum in a recent case that would indicate that
Indiana is in accord with the majority view. Kozanjieff v. Petroff (1939),
19 N. E. (2d) 563. Also see Mishawaka-St. Joseph L. & T. Co. v. Neu (1935),
209 Ind. 433, 196 N. E. 85; Warford v. Hankins (1898), 150 Ind. 489, 50
N. E. 468.
Where there is an agreement for subrogation (called "conventional subro-
gation") with either the creditor, Board of Commissioners of Bartholomew
County v. Jameson (1882), 86 Ind. 154, or the debtor, American Nat'l Bank v.
Holsen (1928), 331 Ill. 662, 163 N. E. 448, subrogation will be allowed not-
withstanding the volunteer character of the payor.
1 See 49 A. L. R. 673 (1927), 17 A. L. R. 452 (1922), Liability of Corpora-
tions on Contracts of Promoter.
2 Since a contract requires two competent parties, and parties are not com-
petent within the meaning of this principle unless they are in being, the
corporation can not contract as such until it has at least a de facto existence.
1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, sec. 205.
3 Gent v. Manufacturers and Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. (1883), 107 Ill. 652,
aff'g. (1883) 13 Ill. App. 308; Hart Potato Growers' Ass'n. v. Greiner (1926),
236 Mich. 638, 211 N. W. 45.
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in being. American jurisdictions,4 except Massachusetts, 5 reach the latter
result by terming it a ratification,6 adoption," the acceptance of an open
continuing offer,8 or a novation. 9
Ratification cannot logically be the correct theory of liability since it pre-
sumes a principal in existence and capable of contracting when the contract
was made. In this situation, because there is no corporation in fact, there can
be neither prinicipal nor agent.'o In fact, the promoter generally acts for
himself and seldom, if ever, even purports to be an agent. Probably the
most generally used term in this connection has been "adoption". The difficulty
with this view is that the promoter remains liable, which is almost certainly
contrary to the intention of the parties when the corporation assents to the
contract. The most rational basis for the matter of promoter's contracts is
the theory of a novation,1 1 which has been expressly accepted by some
cases
12 
and which is inherent in the language and reasoning of others.1 3 As
well as being consistent with the intent of the parties, it would discharge the
promoter at the moment the corporation assumed the obligation.14 The theory
of a continuing offer cannot be reconciled with the law of contracts, since the
existence of an offeree is required.15
The decision in the instant case is consistent with the widespread practice
of the courts to speak of the ratification of the contract. Despite the fact that
the only logically sound basis is that of a novation, due to the firm estab-
lishment of the ratification theory the hope that the courts will speak in
terms of novation is probably, at most, millenial. The decision is sound and
the rule well stated as to the assumption of liability by the corporation on the
contract of the promoter, i. e., the corporation may make the contract its own
4 The contract of a promoter on behalf of a corporation not yet in existence
is apparently an absolute nullity in England. In re Empress Engineering Co.
(1880), 16 Ch. Div. 125; Melhado v. Porto Alegre, N. H. & B. Ry. Co. (1874),
L. R. 9 C. P. 503. The rule, however, has not precluded the possibility of the
implication of a promise to pay for benefits accepted. In re Northumberland
Ave. Hotel Co. (1886), 33 Ch. Div. 16.
5 The Massachusetts rule is based upon a dictum in Abbott v. Hapgood
(1889), 150 Mass. 248, 22 N. E. 907, 5 A. L. R. 586, 15 Am. St. Rep. 193, that
the corporation can not become a party to the contract. However, in Holyoke
Envelope Co. v. United States Envelope Co. (1902), 182 Mass. 171, 65 N. E.
54, it was shown that the corporation could be held liable on the theory of an
alternative offer or an implied contract.
6 Stanton v. New York & E. Ry. Co. (1890), 59 Conn. 272, 22 A. 300.
7 Badger Paper Co. v. Rose (1897), 95 Wis. 145, 70 N. W. 302, 37 L. R.
A. 162.
8 Wall v. Niagara Mining and Smelting Co. (1899), 20 Utah 474, 59
P. 399.
9 Oldham v. Mt. Sterling Improvement Co. (1898), 103 Ky. 529, 45 S.
W. 779.
10 Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co. (1921), 59 Mont. 469, 197 P. 1005.
Restatement, Agency, § 84 (2).
11 1 Williston on Contracts, § 306.
12 In re Super Trading Co. (1927), 22 F. (2d) 480.
13 Oakes v. Cattaraugus Water Co. (1894), 143 N. Y. 430, 38 N. E. 461,
26 L. R. A. 544.
14 1 Williston on Contracts, § 306, and cases cited in footnote 9 therein.
15 Willis on Contracts, § 61 ff.; 1 Williston on Contracts (1936), § 64ff.
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in the same way it might itself enter originally into a similar contract. 1 6
This statement, which presupposes an implied "ratification" in certain cases,
e. g. where, as here, the promoters enter into a contract for the benefit of the
corporation with the understanding (which may be implied) that the contract
will be performed by the corporation, and the latter with knowledge, accepts
the benefits thereof, follows necessarily from the decisions in three recent
Indiana cases relied on by the court.17
The significance of the case is in its qualification of the rule laid down in
the earlier Indiana case of Cushion Heel Shoe Co. qr. Hartt18, viz., that a
corporation will be held liable for services rendered by its promoters before
incorporation only when, by express action taken after it becomes a legal
entity, it recognizes or affirms such claim. The court in that case took the
hasty position that there was no median between the extremes of express
action and mere acceptance of benefits which the corporation could not reject
without ceasing existence. The instant case expressly disapproves the Cushion
Heel case to the extent it is in conflict, and makes a well reasoned statement
of the rule. W. A. V.
TAXATION-INTEROVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-TAATION OF THE INCOME OF
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES BY A STATE.-Respondent, an attorney for the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation, sought a refund of income tax paid to the State
of New York on his salary for the year 1934. The New York Court of
Appeals held such income immune on the authority of New York ex rel. Rogers
v. Graves.1 Held, such a tax is not a burden on national government as to
be within an implied restriction upon the taxing power of the national and
16 1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, § 209.
17 Mt. Pleasant Coal Co. v. Watts (1926), 91 Ind. App. 501, 151 N. E. 7,
allowed recovery etc. for an assignment of a lease, the court held ihat the
corporation by accepting the lease and constructing a mine on the property had
knowingly received the benefits of the contract. Seymour Improvement Co.
v. Viking Sprinkler Co. (1928), 87 Ind. App. 179, 161 N. E. 389, holding
corporation's silence when it received bills and learned plaintiff was looking to
it for payment after allowing plaintiff to install sprinkler system was sufficient
ratification of act of its president in entering into unauthorized contract. Hoosier
Lumber Co. v. Spear (1935), 99 Ind. App. 532, 189 N. E. 633, holding corpora-
tion liable on contract of promoter beneficial to corporation and acquiesced in
by three officers with knowledge.
18 Cushion Heel Shoe Co. v. Hartt (1913), 181 Ind. 167, 103 N. E. 1063,
holding evidence of silence when claim presented to directors not such affirmance
as to constitute ratification.
1 The New York Tax Law (c. 59, McKinney's Consolidated Laws), Sec.
359-2-f, provided expressly for exemption of salaries, wages and other compen-
sation received from the United States of official or employees thereof, in-
cluding persons in the military or naval forces of the United States. In the
Rogers case, the Appellate Court of New York stated that the relator had
not invoked Sec. 359-2-f, and decided the case only on the constitutional ques-
tion. There does not appear in the decision in the instant case any attempt
of the taxpayer to rely on the exemption statute. Subdivision f has been
repealed by an act of May 28, 1937, L. 1937, c. 719, but the repeal was
effective only as of that date. Compare State Tax Comm. of Utah v. Van Cott
(1939), 59 S. Ct. 605.
